Wednesday, August 28, 2019

Civil practice – Discovery – Late production of documents

U.S. District Court

Where a plaintiff and a third-party defendant have moved to preclude the defendants from using late-produced documents in support of or opposition to any motion or at trial, the motion should be denied unless the plaintiff and third-party defendant can identify in writing any deposition witnesses and topics for examination that they believe are reasonably necessary to address any potential prejudice arising out of the late production of documents by the defendants.

“The present dispute concerns a late production of documents by defendants Plain Avenue Storage, LLC and Malden Storage, LLC to plaintiff BRT Management LLC and third-party defendant Brian Wallace. BRT and Wallace have moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 to preclude Plain and Malden from using the late-produced documents in support or opposition to any motion or at trial. …

“Fact discovery closed on October 10, 2018. On October 17, seven days after the close of discovery and 71 days after receiving the request for production, Plain and Malden served additional responsive documents on BRT. The production consisted of a CD containing 638 pages of documents. The CD and accompanying cover letter did not contain the necessary attorney certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g), or any other language identifying the supplemental production. Instead, the cover letter stated only that a ‘CD containing Bates Stamped documents within certain ranges was enclosed.’

“Counsel for BRT and Wallace contend that they mistook the CD as unrelated to their August 7 requests for production. According to counsel, it was not until January 29, 2019, during an e-mail exchange with Plain and Malden’s counsel, that they realized that they had, in fact, received the supplemental production. …

“The circumstances here are certainly troubling. The documents were delivered to BRT and Wallace 41 days late, and indeed seven days after the close of fact discovery. The supplemental production obviously should have included the required certification, and should have clearly identified what the documents were and the discovery requests to which they were responsive. Plain and Malden have not offered a reasonable justification for the late production. The documents appear to be central to their damages claims. And production of documents after the fact-discovery deadline has an obvious impact on the discovery schedule; at a minimum, it precluded the possibility of taking any depositions as to the subject of those documents without relief from the court.

“Nonetheless, counsel for BRT and Wallace are hardly free from blame. …

“In short, counsel for BRT and Wallace have not acted diligently, which carries substantial weight in the sanctions analysis. Had they reviewed the documents when they received them, any prejudice caused by the failure of Plain and Malden to comply with the rules would have been greatly reduced.  Furthermore, the documents appear to be central to the claims of Plain and Malden, and their preclusion would likely mean that BRT and Wallace would prevail in the litigation. For those reasons, the Court is reluctant to preclude Plain and Malden entirely from relying on the late-produced documents.

“That does not mean, however, that no sanction is required. Had the issue been timely raised, and had a reasonable request been made, the Court would likely have permitted discovery to be reopened as necessary in order to give BRT and Wallace an opportunity to examine witnesses about the documents. It is unclear whether that is appropriate here, in light of the long delay of BRT and Wallace in asserting their rights, and in the absence of any specific information concerning what witnesses would need to be deposed, or on what topics. In any event, if BRT and Wallace wish to reopen discovery, they should identify those witnesses, and the relevant topics, so that the Court can fashion appropriate relief. Furthermore, BRT and Wallace is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses arising out of the litigation of this issue, and therefore the Court will give them a period of 14 days in which to seek such a sanction. Otherwise, however, the motion to preclude will be denied. …

“For the foregoing reasons, the motion in limine of BRT Management, LLC and Brian Wallace to preclude Plain Avenue Storage, LLC and Malden Storage, LLC from using certain late-produced documents in support of any motion or opposition or at trial is denied in part and granted in part. Within 14 days of the date of this order (that is, by September 3, 2019), counsel for BRT Management, LLC and Brian Wallace shall:

“(1) if they seek to reopen discovery, file an appropriate motion identifying in writing any deposition witnesses and topics for examination that they believe are reasonably necessary to address any potential prejudice arising out of the late production of documents by Plain Avenue Storage, LLC and Malden Storage, LLC, and
“(2) if they seek to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses arising out of the late production, file an appropriate motion with supporting affidavit(s).”

BRT Management LLC v. Malden Storage, LLC, et al. v. Wallace (Lawyers Weekly No. 02-385-19) (8 pages) (Saylor, J.) (Civil Action No. 17-10005-FDS) (Aug. 20, 2019).


Click here to read the full text of the opinion.

Arbitration – Class action waiver – Wage Act

U.S. District Court

Where a plaintiff “last mile” delivery driver commenced a class action alleging improper classification as an independent contractor and violations of state wage laws, an arbitration clause in the parties’ agreement is unenforceable under Massachusetts law, but a transfer to the Western District of Washington is warranted pursuant to the first-to-file rule.

“Bernard Waithaka (‘Plaintiff’), commenced this class action lawsuit against Amazon.com Inc., and Amazon Logistics Inc. (‘Defendants’) alleging improper classification as independent contractors and violations of state wage laws.  Defendants have moved to compel arbitration or, in the alternative, to transfer or stay this litigation. (Docket No. 29) For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part. …

“The [Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)] contains an exception for ‘contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.’ 9 U.S.C. §1. Plaintiff contends that his employment as a last-mile delivery driver falls within this exception and consequently that the FAA does not apply. …

“… There is one area, however, where a consensus has emerged: truck drivers. ‘[T]hat is, drivers actually involved in the interstate transportation of physical goods ... have been found to be ‘transportation workers’ for purposes of the residuary exemption in Section 1 of the FAA.’ …

“Unlike truck drivers engaged in interstate commerce, however, Plaintiff does not carry goods across state lines. Defendants argue that this distinction precludes application of the exemption to last-mile drivers. …

“… [W]hile last-mile drivers themselves may not cross state lines, they are indispensable parts of Amazon’s distribution system. That system, of course, transports goods in interstate commerce. In the end, Plaintiff’s employment, like the plaintiff in Palcko [v. Airborne Express, Inc., 372 F.3d 588 (3d Cir. 2004)], is so closely related to interstate commerce as to be part of it. …

“… Because Amazon removed to this Court pursuant to CAFA, I will apply Massachusetts choice-of-law rules. …

“The Supreme Judicial Court has made clear that class action waivers embedded in arbitration agreements may violate public policy. …

“… Here, as noted above, the FAA does not apply because Plaintiff’s employment as a last-mile driver falls within the scope of the Section 1 transportation worker exemption. Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s holdings in [AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011)] and American Express [Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. 228 (2013)] do not narrow state public policy rationales for prohibiting class action waivers in arbitration agreements. The requirement that plaintiffs must be effectively precluded from obtaining relief was a necessary condition to evade arbitration where the FAA governed the agreement based on the SJC’s reading of Concepcion. ... It is not necessary here.

“The Wage Act itself evidences an intent to permit plaintiffs to proceed as a class. Further, precluding class adjudication would negatively impact unnamed class members, especially those who may have smaller claims than Plaintiff. Because the FAA does not apply, these public policy rationales are is sufficient to invalidate the agreement. …

“Amazon argues that the Court should transfer this case based on the so-called ‘first-to-file’ rule. Alternatively, Amazon contends that the Court should transfer this case to the Western District of Washington under 28 U.S.C. §1404(a) or stay the action. I find Amazon’s arguments with respect to Section 1404 unconvincing. Nonetheless, transfer is warranted pursuant to the so-called ‘first-to-file’ rule. …

“… I find that Plaintiff falls within the FAA’s transportation worker exemption and that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable under Massachusetts law. Finally, pursuant to the first-to-file rule, I find that transfer to the Western District of Washington is warranted.”

Waithaka v. Amazon.com, Inc., et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 02-384-19) (22 pages) (Hillman, J.) (Civil Action No. 18-40150-TSH) (Aug. 20, 2019).


Employment – Discrimination – Pretext

U.S. District Court

Where the plaintiff, a board-certified, female neurosurgeon of Indian descent, filed a complaint alleging that the defendants discriminated against her on the basis of her gender and ethnicity, summary judgment is inappropriate on the discrimination claims, as a reasonable jury could find the defendants’ proffered reasons for the adverse employment action taken against the plaintiff to be pretextual.

“Plaintiff Deepa Soni, M.D., a board-certified, female neurosurgeon of Indian descent, filed a complaint alleging defendants Robert Wespiser, M.D., Timothy Counihan, M.D., Berkshire Medical Center, Inc. (‘BMC’), Berkshire Faculty Services, Inc. (‘BFS’), and Berkshire Health Systems, Inc. (‘BHS’) discriminated against her on the basis of her gender and ethnicity, retaliated against her, made defamatory statements about her which negatively impacted her career, tortuously interfered with advantageous business relationships, and interfered with her rights in violation of Massachusetts law. …

“As a preliminary matter, Defendants allege that they cannot be liable for Defendant Counihan’s communications because Plaintiff signed the following release: ‘To the fullest extent permitted by law, I extend absolute immunity to, and release from, any and all liability, the hospital and any third party . . . for any acts, communications, reports, records, statements, documents, recommendations or disclosures involving me ... made or given in good faith. ...’ (Docket No. 111 ¶ 51) (emphasis added). Defendants, however, cannot discriminate and retaliate freely because Plaintiff signed the release. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Counihan lied about her and that those lies were motivated by animus. That sort of conduct is inherently not in good faith. Accordingly, if Plaintiff presents enough evidence that a reasonable jury might find for her, that she signed the release is of no moment. …

“… Defendants have … proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action: their portrayal of Plaintiff was truthful. Accordingly, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff has identified evidence that would permit reasonable jurists to conclude that Defendants’ proffered reason is pretextual.

“I find that a reasonable jury could find the proffered reasons pretextual. First, the record demonstrates that reasonable jurors could find some of the things Defendant Counihan said about Plaintiff were false, which would belie Defendants proffered legitimate reason for the adverse action. …

“… Defendants argue that it is implausible that Defendant Counihan retaliated against Plaintiff because of the absence of a temporal nexus between the protected conduct and the adverse action. …
“Accordingly, the question here is whether, despite the almost five-year gap between the protected activity and the adverse employment action, Plaintiff has produced enough evidence to establish a causal connection. …

“… Defendant Counihan admits that his and Plaintiff’s relationship began to deteriorate after Dr. Gilner’s termination. ... According to Plaintiff, Defendant Counihan began to micro-manage her practice and dismiss her concerns during this period, which lead to her resignation. This is not enough, however, to demonstrate the animus required. … Although Defendant Counihan and Plaintiff’s relationship deteriorated after Dr. Gilner was fired, it is unclear what caused this deterioration. Further, the record is absent of any actions or words which directly relate to Plaintiff’s complaint against Dr. Gilner and would raise the inference of animus or support a causal connection. …

“Accordingly, Plaintiff’s retaliation claims must fail. …

“Because a tortious interference claim is typically not permitted against a party to a contract, employees are normally precluded from bringing claims against their employers for tortious interference. ... However, ‘a supervisor can be labile for tortious interference if “actual malice ... was the controlling factor in the supervisor’s interference.”’ …

“Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate actual malice and consequently her claim must fail. First, the Court is skeptical that Plaintiff needs to demonstrate actual malice in this case because the relevant relationship was not the contractual relationship in which Defendant Counihan supervised Plaintiff. And even if Plaintiff had to demonstrate malice, the First Circuit has reasoned that ‘[c]ertain situations lend themselves to proof of malice. Pertinently, the SJC has held that the elements underlying a claim for unlawful discrimination may be used to demonstrate malice in the context of a tortious interference claim.’ Zimmerman v. Direct Federal Credit Union, 262 F.3d 70, 77 (1st Cir. 2001). Thus, if Plaintiff were required to demonstrate malice, because her discrimination claims survive this motion, she has proffered enough evidence of malice at this stage. …

“For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion (Docket No. 105) is granted in part and denied in part. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s discrimination, defamation, and tortious interference claims survive this motion. In addition, Defendants are granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claims.”

Soni v. Wespiser, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 02-383-19) (16 pages) (Hillman, J.) (Civil Action No. 16-10630-TSH) (Aug. 19, 2019).


Click here to read the full text of the opinion.

Loughlin, spouse get OK to use law firm

By Associated Press

U.S. Magistrate Judge M. Page Kelley ruled that actress Lori Loughlin and her fashion designer husband, Mossimo Giannulli, can continue to use Los Angeles-based Latham & Watkins, which recently represented the University of Southern California, an alleged victim in the sweeping college admissions bribery case.

But Kelley declined to rule on a different potential conflict of interest in the couple’s legal representation and said she would decide later, calling it more serious.

Giannulli and Loughlin mostly sat quietly through the brief proceedings. They spoke up only to answer a series of short questions from the judge, acknowledging they each understood the legal risk of retaining the firm and the risks of being represented by the same firm. Neither commented after the hearing.

The couple are accused of paying $500,000 to have their two daughters labeled as recruits to the USC crew team, even though neither participated in the sport. They have pleaded not guilty to charges of conspiracy to commit fraud and money laundering.

Lawyers for Latham & Watkins said it represented USC in an unrelated real estate case that had been handled by different attorneys.

Prosecutors had argued that retaining the firm could pose a serious conflict, especially if the firm’s lawyers questioned USC officials at trial or gathered information from the university during the case’s discovery phase.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Eric S. Rosen argued there is a potentially greater conflict with Giannulli’s additional counsel from the Boston firm Donnelly, Conroy & Gelhaar.

The firm represents Davina Isackson, who, along with her husband, California real estate developer Bruce Isackson, has pleaded guilty to paying $600,000 in shares of stock to get their daughters into USC and the University of California Los Angeles.

George W. Vien, an attorney for the firm, said it is prepared to take steps to prevent conflicts of interest, such as not cross-examining Isackson in the unlikely event she is asked to testify in Giannulli’s case.

Kelley said she would decide later on that potential conflict.

“This is the situation where judges most often remove lawyers from cases, if they are representing someone who is cooperating against another person,” Kelley told Giannulli.

Solo to take seat on Juvenile Court

The Governor’s Council on Aug. 28 voted 7-0 to confirm Jennifer L. McNulty to the newly created position of circuit judge of the Juvenile Court, Worcester Division.

Councilor Robert L. Jubinville was absent.

McNulty is a sole practitioner in Barnstable and Plymouth counties.

Also on Aug. 28, Gov. Charlie Baker nominated William M. White Jr. for a Superior Court judgeship.
White runs a solo practice in Boston and was formerly with Davis, Robinson & White and Amabile & Burkly.

He served as an assistant attorney general and a Suffolk County assistant district attorney in the 1980s.

Poor translation leads to suppressed evidence

By Kris Olson

Justice Barbara Lenk
The inadequate rendering of Miranda warnings by a Spanish-speaking officer untrained in interpretation warranted the suppression not only of the fruits of the search of a murder defendant’s cellphone but also the cell site location information police later obtained using a warrant, the Supreme Judicial Court decided.

Defendant Pedro Vasquez quickly became the primary suspect in the shooting death of his girlfriend in January 2015.

After officers arrested Vasquez, they attempted to advise him of his Miranda rights but determined that he did not have much command of the English language.

The officer pressed into service to translate the Miranda warnings did so as follows:
“1. You have the right to remain quiet.
“2. Anything that you say can be against you ... the, of the court.
“3. You the right to consult with a lawyer for advice before being and to have him present with you during the interrogation.
“4. If you do not have the means to pay, to pay a, and if you wish for it, you the right to be a law, lawyer before being interrogated.
“5. If you decide to be now, without the presence of a lawyer, you still have the right to stop the, that any moment until you talk with a lawyer.”

Vasquez was then directed to initial each of the warnings on a printed Miranda form written in English, which he did.

The commonwealth argued that, notwithstanding the deficiencies in the translation, the totality of the circumstances suggested that Vasquez understood his rights. But the SJC disagreed.

“Although we have recognized that the translation of Miranda warnings into a defendant’s native language need not be ‘word for word,’ the translation cannot be so ‘misstated to the point of
being contradictory’ or equivocal,” Justice Barbara A. Lenk wrote for the court.

The commonwealth conceded that if the SJC concluded that the Miranda warnings were inadequate, the fruits of the search of Vasquez’s cellphone evidence must be suppressed.

But the court said that the problem with the translation also deprived the state of the requisite probable cause to obtain a search warrant for the CSLI.

“Ordinarily, police may be able to demonstrate the requisite nexus by connecting the defendant to ownership of a particular device and by showing a substantial basis that the device will contain relevant evidence of the crime — that is, the defendant’s location at or around the time the crime was committed,” Lenk wrote. “Here, however, when we remove from the calculus any tainted evidence contained within the affidavit in support of the application for a search warrant, such as the defendant’s disclosure of his telephone number, the Commonwealth has not met its burden with regard to establishing any such nexus.”

The state had also failed to demonstrate any connection between the commission of the crime and the 32 days for which it had sought the CSLI, the SJC concluded.

The 32-page decision is Commonwealth v. Vasquez, Lawyers Weekly No. 10-140-19. The full text of the ruling can be found here.